Periodic financial crises have been a recurrent feature of capitalism for centuries.
2 Despite the efforts of governments to regulate speculation and mitigate the consequences of boom and bust cycles, and much talk about a "great moderation" since the 1980s, recent events are a reminder that we are far from consigning manias and panics to the annals of history. Although the substantive importance of financial crises is self-evident, the politics of financial crisis response in contemporary, developed economies remains a relatively underdeveloped area of research. 3 Economists, using cross-national data, have traced the incidence of financial crises to factors such as capital flow bonanzas, 4 financial liberalization, 5 and macroeconomic mismanagement or shocks, 6 On the face of it, Japan's slow, seemingly haphazard response contrasts sharply to the rapid reaction with overwhelming firepower by US financial authorities. Conventional accounts have attributed Japan's lackadaisical response to a variety of political, institutional, and cultural factors unique to that country.
but the politics underlying these policies remain underexplored. Japan's "lost decade" of the 1990s has spawned a largely self-contained literature attributing stagnation to a variety of Japan-specific factors. In this paper, we will examine the divergent patterns of policy response in what are perhaps the two most important episodes of developed-country crises in recent years: Japan's post-bubble "lost decade" of the 1990s and the United States subprime crisis of 2008. 2 For an excellent summary, see Kindleberger 2000, 228; Reinhart and Rogoff 2009 We will argue that these accounts are incomplete. The novel nature of Japan's crisis necessitated a process of learning, trial and error, and experimentation to determine the most effective solutions and methods of implementation. Policy innovation, like innovation in the private sector, is a search for unknown solutions under conditions of extreme uncertainty. As such, it takes more time and more effort for first-movers to ascertain the correct policy response. Once effective solutions have been demonstrated by earlier actors, subsequent implementation is much more rapid, targeted, and effective. Hence, when the United States encountered a similar financial crisis in 2008, the response was a rapid, scaled-up application of policy measures developed gradually over the course of Japan's long stagnation. In short, we are proposing a theory of first-mover disadvantage in policy response.
To establish the plausibility of this theory, we conduct an in-depth examination of the policy measures undertaken by Japanese and U.S. financial authorities. Our analysis is based on interviews with financial policymakers in the US and Japan as well as publicly available information and data.
The empirical evidence broadly confirms our theoretical predictions. Japan's initial response was characterized by a cautious application of conventional policy measures, followed by a lengthy period of policy experimentation, and finally the "discovery" of a policy mix that proved effective.
In comparison, the United States entered the subprime crisis of 2008 with a wealth of information from the Japanese case. Key US policymakers had firsthand experience with Japan's crisis in their previous posts or through academic research. US financial officials pursued an early, large-scale implementation of policy measures deemed to have been successful in the Japanese case -a zero interest rate policy, quantitative easing, recapitalization of the financial sector with public support from top government leadership, and a large, frontloaded fiscal stimulus package. Public support for these measures was cultivated through explicit reference to the perils of following the Japanese example, a strategy unavailable to Japanese officials in the early 1990s.
Unlike analyses focusing on country-specific factors to explain financial crisis response, our theory has generalizable implications for a wide range of contingencies. These may include other types of unprecedented economic challenges, outbreaks of unknown disease, and novel terrorist tactics. We will discuss these issues and implications for additional research in the conclusion.
Theory: First Mover Disadvantage
Our argument rests on a simple premise. When a policy challenge is novel or unprecedented, government responses will be characterized by a process that fundamentally differs from those who respond in a later time period. This is attributable to an inherent feature of being the first actor to respond to a new problem -since effective solutions and methods of implementation are unknown, policymakers must engage in a process of trial and error and experimentation. This process often appears messy, haphazard, ineffective, and confused. It is possible that such first movers will hit upon effective solutions quickly by happenstance. However, it is more likely that they will encounter numerous dead ends as they apply conventional approaches only to find they are ineffective, experiment with novel policy ideas that turn out to be duds, and only gradually discover effective policy solutions.
In contrast, policymakers encountering similar problems in the future can learn from the experience of the first movers. Since the first movers have engaged in a long, painful process of discovery, there is less need for policy experimentation. Policymakers can avoid policies that have been demonstrated not to work. They can pick and choose the policies that appear most effective based on received wisdom and observation. Second-movers also have important political advantages. They can muster political support for their policies by pointing to the example of the first mover. Political efforts and resources can be concentrated to build support behind a small number of effective policies rather than being spread out across a wide range of approaches that may or may not work. Even if the proposed policies prove to be politically unpopular, rapid and massive application can sidestep the erosion and fatigue that first movers tend to face as they experiment with successive policy solutions.
Our theory draws from a rich literature in economics, political science, and other fields that examine innovation processes and learning. 8 technologies are subject to spillover effects. 9 While initial research and development is a costly process subject to unintended consequences and frequent dead ends, once new ideas and technologies are discovered, adoption by other actors tends to be more rapid and effective.
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A similar insight also lies behind economic convergence predicted by neoclassical growth models such as the one pioneered by Robert Solow. 11 Since capital is subject to diminishing returns and technological diffusion will tend to equalize total factor productivity growth across national boundaries, countries are predicted to converge towards similar rates of economic development and growth. Information and technological diffusion also played a critical role in shaping the developmental patterns and strategies of late-developing states -such states often pursued interventionist strategies to facilitate technology transfer and guide the trajectory of development.
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Although there is a well-developed literature on international diffusion in political science, 13 these studies have been frequently criticized for failing to sufficiently account for the possibility of myopic, independent adoption of common policies.
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More importantly, existing studies have generally focused on identifying factors that facilitate or impede diffusion rather than the distinction between first and second-movers, the subject of this paper. It is not our goal in this paper to explain patterns of international diffusion. Rather, we posit that first and second-movers are fundamentally distinct, and scholars are likely to reach biased inferences about sources of policy variation without sufficiently accounting for this fact. This is not a concern for the purposes of this paper -we provide direct, firsthand evidence that policymakers in the United States actively incorporated lessons from Japan into their policy response in 2008-2009. 9 Acs and Audretsch 1988 ; Jaffe 1989 ; Feldman 1994 . 10 For an overview, see Rogers 1983; Attewell 1992 . 11 Solow 1956 Solow 1957 ; Lucas 1988 ; Romer 1990 ; Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 1992 ; Young 1993 12 Gerschenkron 1962 Johnson 1982; Okimoto 1990. 13 Scholars have examined, among other things, the diffusion of neoliberal economic ideas (Simmons, Guzman, and Elkins 2006 ; Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2008) , democratic institutions (Gleditsch and Ward 2006 ) , bureaucratic and organizational norms (Finnemore 1993 ) , and a wide range of intersubjective norms and ideas (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) . Epistemic communities play an important role in facilitating the transfer of information across national borders (Adler and Haas 1992 ; Haas 1992 ) . 14 Volden, Ting, and Carpenter 2008 One illustration of our general theoretical perspective is the impact of novel, contagious diseases according to the timing of incidence. Figure 1 illustrates the number of cases and deaths of SARS and H1N1 by country. In both cases, the number of reported cases and deaths were highest for the earliest countries to encounter the disease -China and Hong Kong for SARS and Mexico and the United States for H1N1. The number of cases and fatalities is more closely associated with timing of first incidence than other plausible explanatory factors such as quality of the health system and economic development. 15 Because of the novel nature of these diseases, countries that encountered them for the first time were not immediately aware of the nature or severity of the problem they were confronting. In comparison, once the diseases and their characteristics were identified, other countries implemented countermeasures such as screening, quarantines, hygiene programs, public information campaigns, and vaccination. Nonetheless, governments of the firstmover states were criticized heavily for a host of structural inadequacies and policy failures.
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[Insert Figure 1 about Here]
We are, of course, not claiming that economic crises are identical to contagious diseases.
Financial crises occur with no clear pathogen, take longer to unfold, and impact a smaller total population -countries or financial institutions as opposed to individuals. Hence, the discovery of effective solutions is a more messy process subject to greater uncertainty and error, more akin to the 15 Although we omit the statistical results from this paper for the sake of relevance and brevity, we used a negative binomial model to examine the correlates of disease incidence and fatalities. Common indicators of development (e.g., GDP/capita) and health quality (e.g., infant mortality rates; % of population with access to sanitation facilities) are not meaningfully related to incidence or fatalities, while the timing of outbreak in the country (measured as number of days between the first reported global instance of the disease and the first reported incident in the relevant country) is very strongly related to both dependent variables. 16 E.g., see Hsieh 2003 ; Yang 2006, 169-71; Cevallos 2009 ; Vargas-Parada 2009 management of disease before the advent of modern medicine. 17 Nonetheless, we posit that the pattern of response should exhibit important similarities. In both cases, the response of first movers is likely to be slower and less effective as the problem is identified and effective solutions developed gradually. Second movers should benefit from two primary advantages: problem recognition and adoption of solutions developed by the first mover. Our theoretical propositions are summarized in Table 1 .
[Insert Table 1 about Here]
Japanese and US Response to Financial Crises
Japan struggled through a debilitating period of economic stagnation since the burst of its [Insert Figure 2 economies in the recent episode, and in any case, the number of cases is insufficient to draw strong inferences about cross-national economic performance. We will therefore focus our efforts on policy response through comparison of Japan and the United States.
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The Novel Nature of Japan's Financial Crisis
The utility of our case studies rests on the premise that Japan's financial crisis was sufficiently novel as to warrant the characterization of Japan as "first mover." Japan was certainly not the first country to experience an asset price bubble or financial crisis, which can be traced back at least to the 17 th century.
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among OECD countries (e.g., see Horton, Kumar, and Mauro 2009) . In terms of monetary policy, the Bank of Japan has been more willing to purchase risky securities that other Central Banks have avoided, such as equities, commercial paper, and real estate investment trusts.
However, Japan's crisis was the first instance of a "return to depression economics" by an advanced developed economy in the post-World War II period. As Paul Krugman aptly notes, "Japan showed us a truth that our grandfathers knew, but that we had forgotten: that even cutting the interest rate all the way to zero may still not be enough." 28 Japan was the first postwar economy to encounter a liquidity trap, in which deflation pushes nominal rates against the zero bound and renders conventional monetary policy ineffective. 29 In addition, the widespread damage to private sector balance sheets brought about by declining asset prices led to the first instance of a "balance sheet recession" since the 1930s, in which growth is restrained as private financial institutions, firms, and individuals are driven to focus on debt repayment over consumption and investment.
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Japanese policymakers had several precedents that they could draw on, but these either offered limited lessons for Japan's predicament or were judged to be irrelevant. Specifically, the Savings and Loan Crisis of the 1980s in the United States was the most proximate episode of financial distress in another major economy. However, the United States had allowed the S&L problem to fester for the good part of a decade, 31 and although resolution ultimately cost about $100 billion, the macroeconomic consequences were limited -the US economy grew robustly through the 1980s and only experienced a brief, shallow recession in 1990-1991. If any lessons were to be learned from the S&L Crisis, it was that regulatory forbearance and postponement of resolution until better economic times was a reasonable policy response. Japanese officials viewed other recent crisis episodes as being largely irrelevant to their circumstances. The Latin American Debt Crisis affected developing economies with balance of payments difficulties, a far cry from Japan in the early 1990s. The Scandinavian trio of Finland, Norway, and Sweden, experienced financial instability in the 1990s with considerable similarities to Japan.
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28 Krugman 2000, viii However, the Scandinavian crises were occurring concurrently and the magnitude of the problem was smaller than that in 29 The global crisis of 2008 has many features akin to Japan's crisis of the 1990s. Both crises were preceded by a dramatic run up in asset price valuations. Housing prices in the United States, which have traditionally exhibited zero growth after inflation, increased by about 150% within the course of a decade. Other countries experienced similar bubbles in asset prices -notably Australia, France, Ireland, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Leading up to the crisis, housing price appreciation in some of these countries was comparable to that experienced by Japan during its bubble.
-had been consigned to the dustbin of history. 35 The subsequent crisis has been associated with collapses in asset prices, deflationary pressure, and financial sector instability. Disinflation has prompted concerns over the potential for a Japanese-style liquidity trap. 36 Although the trial is still out, many economists are predicting anemic economic growth for an extended period for the affected economies. Despite these similarities, US officials have argued that a Japanese-style financial crisis was avoided through quick, decisive action -according to Secretary of State Timothy Geithner, "overwhelming financial force to break the back of the financial panic."
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In this section, we will provide a comparison of how Japan and the United States responded to their respective financial crises based on interviews with officials in both countries as well as 33 Despite a run up in prices, real estate valuations (price-to-rent ratios) in Scandinavia were largely in line with other developed countries in the late 1980s. Japanese real estate valuations, on the other hand, climbed to about twice the OECD average before gradually falling into line over the next two decades. In equity markets, the price-to-earnings ratio for Japanese equities hit a peak of 70 in 1989, while valuations in the Scandinavian countries averaged about 20. Further compounding the difficulties in Japan was the widespread practice of cross-shareholding and real estate investments by private firms in Japan, which snowballed the effects of asset price deflation through private sector balance sheets. The Scandinavian countries also never faced sustained deflation and therefore had no need to resort to unconventional monetary policy measures. 34 e.g., Friedman and Schwartz 1971; Eichengreen and Sachs 1985 ; Eichengreen 1996 primary and secondary evidence. In particular, we will focus on monetary policy and financial sector bailouts. The case study evidence largely supports our theoretical predictions. Japanese policymakers initially responded to their crisis through use of conventional policy measures. Once these were proved ineffectual, Japan entered a long period of trial and error and experimentation.
As we will show, an effective policy mix was implemented by the early 2000s.
In contrast, by the time the US experienced a financial crisis in 2008, the Japanese experience provided ample information about the appropriate policy response. US policymakers quickly recognized the relevance of Japan's crisis and responded in large part through a rapid, stepped-up application of policy measures demonstrated to be effective from the Japanese experience. The relevance of the Japanese example is confirmed by numerous officials responsible for policy implementation as well as public statements by top government officials including the President, Treasury Secretary, and Federal Reserve Chairman. As we will discuss, in some instances, US officials mimicked Japanese policies despite having advised the Japanese government to pursue a different course during the 1990s.
Monetary Policy
In contemporary macroeconomics, monetary policy is generally viewed as the principal policy tool by which governments influence aggregate economic outcomes. 38 In Japan and the The BOJ's initial response to the bursting of the bubble was fairly conventional. After realizing the economy was rapidly deteriorating, the BOJ reduced interest rates in succession, brining the overnight lending rate from 6% in 1990 to 1% by 1995. 39 The BOJ gained enhanced formal independence in 1997. Grimes provides an excellent summary and analysis of BOJ policymaking.
However, by 1998, the limitations of conventional monetary policy were becoming increasingly evident as Japan's economy slipped into outright contraction and deflation. At this point, the BOJ began to carefully experiment with a series of unconventional policy measures. In February 1999, the BOJ reduced the target call rate to 0.15% and introduced the "Zero Interest Rate Policy (ZIRP)," in which "The Bank of Japan will provide more ample funds and encourage the uncollateralized overnight call rate to move as low as possible." Rather than pursing other unconventional measures such as inflation-targeting, price-level targeting, currency depreciation, or "helicopter" money-financed transfers, the Fed largely followed the blueprint laid out by the BOJ but implemented the policies more quickly and with greater scale.
This reflected practical, political difficulties associated with the other unconventional measures.
Inflation-targeting risks undermining central bank credibility if the target proves unachievable.
Currency depreciation, if openly pursued, might be interpreted as predatory by foreign governments. Monetary policy actions undertaken by the BOJ and the US Federal Reserve largely conform to our theoretical predictions. Figure 3 provides a graphical depiction of policy rates and quantitative easing during the crisis episodes. As a first mover, the BOJ initially applied conventional policy tools and failed to realize the novel nature of the threats it faced. As the crisis was prolonged and deflation took hold, the BOJ began experimenting with novel, unprecedented policies including zero interest rates and quantitative easing. The US Federal Reserve acted with the full benefit of hindsight -Chairman Bernanke himself had carefully studied the Japanese example and came to office prepared to deal with a contingency resembling Japan or the 1930s Depression.
The US response was more rapid, more massive, and perhaps more effective than that of the Japanese financial authorities. However, the US response was no more innovative or creative -in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, instead of experimenting with novel policy tools, the Fed largely adopted and scaled up BOJ initiatives that were deemed to have achieved a measure of success.
The Fed also focused its quantitative easing program on fairly "safe" securities such as US treasury bonds and mortgagebacked securities, eschewing the more unorthodox and potentially controversial instruments that the BOJ had experimented with, such as commercial paper and equities.
Bailout of Financial Institutions
Asset price deflation wreaked havoc on the balance sheets of financial institutions in both Japan and the United States during their respective financial crises. In the early 1990s, Japanese financial authorities attempted to manage the crisis according to conventional measures that had been developed over the course of Japan's economic development. effectively managed the Japanese financial system for many years through an informal regulatory regime based on policy networks incorporating political and private sector actors. A convoy approach was adopted, in which no banks were allowed to fail. Previous episodes of banking sector disruption, including serious difficulties in the 1960s, were handled by arranging "rescue mergers,"
by which stronger banks would absorb struggling banks along with their impaired assets.
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Hence, as Japan's stock market and real estate markets began to collapse, the Ministry of Finance initially responded through a continuation of what were deemed to be well-established policy measures. The primary focus was on regulatory forbearance -allowing financial institutions to mask their balance sheet problems on the assumption that a resumption of economic growth and asset price reflation would right the ship over time. In particular, accounting rules were relaxed and financial institutions were encouraged to implement various measures to sweep their problems "under the rug."
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Because of extensive cross-shareholding, Japanese corporations were heavily exposed to the stock market, which had rapidly declined by over 50% by 1992. The Ministry of Finance therefore intervened in stock markets to mitigate pressure on private balance sheets from falling equity prices.
Pension fund assets within the Trust Fund Bureau were used to purchase stocks to hold the Nikkei 225 above the psychologically important 16,000 level. These public purchases accounted for one third of all activity in the Tokyo stock exchange in the spring of 1993. 50 The Ministry of Finance also discouraged short-selling by requesting the names of large sellers from major brokerages and encouraged private institutions make investments based on longer time horizons.
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Throughout the 1990s, Japanese financial authorities struggled to secure public support for any sort of financial sector recapitalization. In 1992, a speech by Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa
These "pricekeeping operations" were successful in relieving downward pressure in the short-run, but they did not ultimately contribute to a resolution of financial sector difficulties. 48 The set of policy measures implemented under Koizumi finally reversed the accumulation of bad loans on the books of Japanese financial institutions. According to the Financial Services that he would implement a recapitalization as a preventive measure to prevent potential disruption to the financial system. This was an unprecedented measure and based on shaky legal grounds, but the policy had the desired effect of serving as a wakeup call to the entire financial sector. Banks subsequently began to write off bad assets and cut off funding to delinquent "zombie" In the view of US policymakers, the Japanese experience highlighted the necessity of quick, massive, and preemptive public money injection as a means to address financial crises. As US Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner noted in 2010 in response to a question about Japan's experience:
"…we were going to try to follow as best we could the basic lessons of mistakes made by many governments in past financial crises, which had typically been to wait too long to escalate, to move only gradually…They under-do it rather than overdoing it. And they move too quickly to put on the brakes at the first signs of life and hope. That's a little oversimplified but that is a simple lesson of the arc of crisis response."
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To a significant degree, these conclusions by US financial policymakers were developed through direct experience. preemptive recapitalization of the financial sector using public funds. President Obama leveraged the example of Japan during his first presidential news conference, asserting that, "We saw this happen in Japan in the 1990s, where they did not act boldly and swiftly enough, and as a consequence they suffered what was called the 'lost decade' where essentially for the entire '90s they did not see any significant economic growth." He announced that his economic officials were hard at work to prevent such long-lasting stagnation.
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This Japan-related experience directly contributed to the policy prescriptions eventually adopted by the Treasury. Unlike Japan, US officials sought to quickly rectify problems in financial sector balance sheets. Stress tests were conducted to identify capital shortfalls and remove opacity from the financial system. The Bush administration exerted pressure on Congress to pass the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), which gave US financial authorities $700 billion (about 5%
of GDP) and wide latitude to use the funds to address the crisis. In particular, TARP legislation System, determines the purchase of which is necessary to promote financial market stability…" US officials interpreted equities of private firms as falling under "any other financial instrument." This justified reallocating TARP funds from their original intended purpose -purchase of toxic assetsto private sector recapitalization. Hence, US policymakers were able to manage a key political problem that had plagued Japanese financial authorities -deep public opposition to financial sector bailouts -by proceeding rapidly, asking for a large amount of funds at the outset, pointing to the examples of Japan's mistakes, directly involving the highest levels of executive office to build public support, and obtaining maximum flexibility during the height of financial panic. them on their books at much higher previous valuations. The suspension of mark-to-market rules is an effective measure to stem the self-fulfilling dynamics of an immediate crisis -declining asset values damage balance sheets, which force asset sales, which lead to further declines in asset valuesbut it also incentivizes financial institutions to sit on bad assets in the hopes of eventual recovery rather than take their losses and move on.
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Figure 4 presents a general timeline of financial rescue measures undertaken by both countries. Japan's efforts on recapitalizations largely conform to our predictions. The initial response primarily focused on application of conventional policy measures, such as maintenance of the convoy system and an assumption that reversion in asset prices would eventually right the ship.
This was accompanied and followed by a range of unconventional policies, many which turned out to be failures, ranging from price-keeping operations to creative accounting rules to prevent further damage to private sector balance sheets. recapitalizations. This is exemplified by the FASB decision to suspend market-to-market accounting rules under pressure from the financial sector.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
Alternative Explanations and Counterarguments
We should emphasize that our theory is not meant to explain all observed variation between the responses of Japan and the United States. Other factors undoubtedly played some role in determining the behavior of policymakers in these two countries -among other things, institutional differences, cultural factors, the role of particular individuals, and the proliferation of derivatives and the shadow banking system. Nonetheless, we believe that the case studies establish the plausibility of our claims. In addition, compared to country-specific explanations, our theory has the attraction of generalizability. Unlike theories that rely on Japan-specific or US-specific factors, our theory can be tested through application to a wider range of countries and issues.
Nonetheless, it is necessary to address several alternative explanations and counterarguments that may call into question our central claims. First, some may argue that the differences between the US and Japan are wholly attributable to differences in the nature of the crises confronted. In particular, although it is true that the US authorities moved relatively more quickly towards recapitalization, some of this may be attributed to different initial conditions. Since the US entered the subprime crisis in 2008 with mark-to-market accounting rules, it was relatively more difficult in the initial stages to kick the can down the road and hope for an eventual recovery in asset prices.
The proliferation of derivatives and securitization had created what Gorton calls the "shadow banking system," and events in 2008 resembled a classic bank run on the repo market.
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76 Gorton 2010 These features of the US market in 2008 arguably forced the hands of US financial authorities to a far greater extent than was the case in Japan. However, this is unlikely to account for all of the observed variation. US authorities could have and eventually did suspend market-to-market rules.
Conditions in Japan in 1997 were not unlike those experienced in the US in 2008, with three large financial institutions collapsing within the course of a month, but this did not solicit a comparable reaction. A variety of US officials have also stated publicly that a major motivation for the rapid response was a desire to avoid repeating Japan's errors.
Another plausible alternative explanation is that the strong presence and political influence of financial institutions in the US made the bailout quicker and more generous than in Japan. 
Conclusion
We have argued that Japanese and US policymakers operated under fundamentally different conditions during their respective financial crises. Japanese policymakers underwent a process of learning, adjustment, experimentation, and discovery. This made their response appear, in retrospect, haphazard, myopic, and ineffective. Comparatively, the US entered the crisis with ample empirical evidence, received wisdom, and practical policy lessons from the Japanese case. The US response therefore came with greater force, speed, and precision.
In both monetary policy and financial sector bailouts, Japanese financial authorities initially had difficulty recognizing the full extent of their problems. Even when gradual recognition occurred, effective solutions were not immediately apparent and only arose through a slow process of trial and error. On financial recapitalizations, the lack of a convincing precedent made it particularly difficult for Japanese political leaders to convince a skeptical public. US policymakers attempted to avoid Japan's dilemma by acting quickly and decisively. The Bernanke Fed quickly reduced rates to zero 91 See discussion in Adler and Haas ; Haas ; Helleiner 1994; Cohen 1996 . 92 More generally, we have proposed a new theory of policy response and learning. Like firms in the private sector and early-developing states, countries dealing with novel challenges are distinct from later responders. The initial process of policy innovation is chaotic and messy, featuring many dead ends. In politics, first movers are at an additional disadvantage as their constituents quickly lose patience with the perceived incompetence of their leaders. Second-mover countries can avoid the failures of the first mover and selectively adopt the policy innovations that appear most effective.
Without accounting for this possibility, scholars may reach biased inferences about cross-national variation in policy implementation, as we illustrate with Japan's lost decade and public responses to novel, contagious diseases.
Our theory could be tested through application to a broader range of policy issues in which countries face novel threats with a temporal lag -e.g., other types of contagious disease and health hazards, unprecedented environmental change, natural disasters, and terrorism and non-traditional threats. We predict that first movers will tend to spend more time before implementing effective solutions and experience higher cumulative costs. Subsequent adopters will tend to implement successful policies from the first mover with greater speed, scale, and effect. In terms of future research, we suspect testing the theory will be most productive in cases where the novel contingency is non-sentient or at least non-strategic. For example, the terrorist attacks of September 11 were novel and catastrophic for the United States, and if similar tactics were employed again, other countries will likely be able to respond with greater efficacy. However, because potential terrorists are aware of this, future attacks are unlikely to follow the same template. To put it differently, at least to some degree, future 9/11-style attacks are off of the equilibrium path. In contrast, phenomena such as contagious disease, economic crises, and environmental damage do not have a mind of their own and therefore offer greater scope for empirical evaluation. 
